

EXPLAINING THE HIGH LEVEL OF PARTY DISCIPLINE IN THE ARGENTINE CONGRESS

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PARTY DISCIPLINE IN THE ARGENTINE CONGRESS*

This chapter examines the level and determinants of party discipline in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies during the presidencies of Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-95, 1995-99). Both members of congress and academics consider party discipline in the Argentine Congress to be (comparatively) very high (Jones 1997a; Molinelli 1991; Mustapic and Goretti 1992). While the conventional wisdom of high levels of party discipline is nearly universal in Argentina, there have been no empirical studies of roll call voting behavior during the post-1983 era and virtually no structured attempts to explain the principal sources of this high level of discipline.

This chapter has two goals. First, undertaking the first analysis of roll call votes in the post-1983 period it underscores the comparatively high levels of party discipline in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Second, it identifies the principal determinants of this highly disciplined voting behavior.

ARGENTINE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

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Argentina is a federal republic consisting of 23 provinces and a semi-autonomous federal capital.¹ It has a presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature and since 1983 has represented one of Latin America's most vibrant and successful democracies.

The Argentine Chamber of Deputies has 257 members who are elected from multi-member districts (the 23 provinces and the federal capital) for four year terms.² The deputies are elected from closed party lists using the d'Hondt divisor form of proportional representation. In the event that a deputy dies or resigns during office he/she is replaced by the next person on the party list who has not yet occupied a chamber seat.³ One-half (127 and 130) of the Chamber is renewed every two years, with each district renewing one-half of its legislators (or the closest equivalent).

The 24 provinces receive a number of deputies in proportion to their respective population, with the following restrictions: (1) that no district receive fewer than five deputies, and (2) that no district receive fewer deputies than it possessed during the 1973-76 democratic period. As a result of these rules the least populous provinces (Catamarca, La Pampa, La Rioja, San Luis, Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego) are highly overrepresented in the Chamber. For example, the least populous quartile (i.e. those six provinces listed above) contains 3.9% of the population, yet possesses 11.7% of the Chamber seats (and 25% of the Senate seats). In contrast the country's most populous province (Buenos Aires) is highly underrepresented. Buenos Aires accounts

¹ The national territory of Tierra del Fuego achieved provincial status in 1990. For stylistic reasons it and the federal capital (Capital Federal) will generally be referred to as "provinces" in the remainder of the text.

² Prior to 1991 the Chamber had 254 deputies (three were added after Tierra del Fuego became a province). In 1983 all 254 deputies were elected at the same time.

³ Intra-mandate turnover is relatively common in Argentina. During the 1989-91 period analyzed here 21 deputies (8%) were replaced by alternates (i.e., suplentes). For the cohorts elected in 1985, 1987, 1989, and 1991 an average of 18% of the deputies were replaced by a suplente during their term in office (Jones 1996).

for 38.7% of the national population, but only holds 27.2% of the Chamber seats.⁴ Two of the other most populous provinces, Cordoba and Santa Fe, are moderately underrepresented, with 8.5% and 8.6% of the population and 7.0% and 7.4% of the seats respectively. The other large district, Capital Federal is slightly overrepresented (9.1% of the population and 9.7% of the seats) due to point (2) above. The current distribution of seats was carried out using the 1980 census. While a new allocation of seats should have been conducted following the 1991 census, this has not occurred, and is unlikely to occur anytime in the near future.

The Senate is composed of 72 members, with every province (and the federal capital) represented by three senators.⁵ Until 2001 these senators will continue to be elected indirectly by the provincial legislatures (with one-third of the Senate being renewed in 1998), with the stipulation that no one party can have more than two senators from a province.⁶

Every Argentine province has its own constitution with a directly elected governor and legislature. The provincial governments are very important political entities, controlling relatively large budgets and exercising influence over vital areas of public policy such as education, health and public safety. Furthermore, the principal locus of

⁴ If the 257 Chamber seats were allocated based purely on population (with each province receiving one seat at the minimum as in the United States), then the province of Buenos Aires would have 99 deputies instead of the 70 it currently possesses.

⁵ Prior to the 1994 constitutional reform all of the country's 22 provinces (23 after 1990) and its federal capital were represented by two senators. Senators were elected indirectly for nine year terms by the provincial legislatures using the plurality formula, except in Capital Federal where they were selected via an electoral college. By lottery two-thirds of the Senate began in 1983 with either three or six year initial terms, with no province having two senators on the same cycle.

⁶ The provincial legislatures actually have very little latitude in this choice. In 1998 for example, any senate seat being renewed goes to the plurality party in the provincial legislature. The only exception is if this party already holds two seats, in which case the seat goes to the second largest party in the provincial legislature. In all cases the party chooses its candidate who is then ratified by the provincial legislature. Unfortunately however, the constitutional article governing this process was not very well written, and has been subject to distinct interpretations by the political parties, provincial legislatures, and Senate, which has led to some serious conflicts in several instances (e.g., the 1998 elections of senators from Chaco, Corrientes, and Jujuy). At present, the PJ dominated Senate appears to be using the interpretation for each specific case that best suits the interests of the PJ.

partisan competition in Argentina is at the provincial level, making a strong base in the provinces vital for electoral success at the national level. After the president and a few key national government ministers, the most powerful political actors in Argentina are generally the governors (particularly within the PJ).

THE ARGENTINE PARTY SYSTEM

The Argentine party system has evolved substantially since the return to democracy in 1983. As illustrated by Table 1, the two dominant political parties during this period have been the Partido Justicialista (PJ, also known as the Peronist Party) and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). Whereas the PJ has maintained a consistently substantial presence in the Chamber and Senate since 1983; the UCR has experienced a significant downward slide, particularly in the Chamber. In 1985 the UCR held 51.2% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Following the 1997 Chamber elections it held only 26.5%.

Table 1 about here

In addition to the PJ and UCR, other important actors in the Chamber are the small center-right provincial parties that tend to compete in only one province (where they are often the dominant, or main opposition, party). Many of these parties have since 1989 provided votes for the Menem administration in the legislature (in exchange for benefits for their provinces as well as for ideological reasons). On numerous occasions these parties have been quite helpful to the Menem administration when it has

experienced difficulties with a select number of PJ legislators (particularly in the Chamber) or where it has faced the strident and universal opposition of the UCR and the minor center-left and left parties (Sin and Palanza 1997).⁷

Finally, a third party, Frepaso (Frente País Solidario), recently has had a great deal of electoral success. Composed primarily of ex-Peronists, members of small established center-left parties, along with some ex-Radicals and people from non-partisan backgrounds, Frepaso currently holds 41 seats in the Chamber.⁸

Table 2 provides the composition of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, based on the actual membership of the official party blocs, during the period (1989-91) analyzed in this version of the chapter. During this period the PJ was the plurality party. It held 120 seats during 1989-90, and 108 seats in 1991 following the defection of eight deputies (who formed the Movimiento Peronista [MP]; also known as the Grupo de los Ocho) in December of 1990 and three deputies who defected in February of 1991 to form Afirmación Peronista (AP).⁹ The next largest party was the UCR with 90 seats, followed by the UCeDé with 11. None of the remaining parties held more than three seats. Most of these parties either had presented on a joint list with the PJ in the previous elections (e.g., Partido Demócrata Cristiano [PDC], Partido Intransigente [PI], Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo [MID]) or were center-right provincial parties such as the Partido Autonomista (PA) and Partido Liberal (PL) from Corrientes, Movimiento Popular Jujeno (MPJ), Partido Demócrata (PD) of Mendoza, Movimiento Popular Neuquino (MPN), Partido Popular Rionegrino (PPR), Partido

⁷ Also important (particularly during the 1989-93 period) was the support of the now defunct center-right Unión del Centro Democrático (UCeDé) whose deputies generally supported Menem administration initiatives in the Chamber.

⁸ This figure does not take into account the defection of three deputies who were elected on the Frepaso list in 1995. For the 1997 election Frepaso and the UCR presented a joint list in 14 of the provinces.

⁹ The final lost deputy stems from the resignation of a deputy from Formosa and his replacement by a deputy belonging to the Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo which had presented a joint list with the PJ in the province.

Renovador de Salta (PRS), Partido Bloquista (PB) of San Juan, Partido Demócrata Progresista (PDP) of Santa Fe, and Fuerza Republicana (FR) of Tucuman.¹⁰

Table 2 about here

ROLL CALL VOTES IN ARGENTINA

In Argentina one-half of the legislature is replaced on December 10 of every odd year. This study employs roll call data from the 1989-91 legislative period (December 10, 1989 to December 9, 1991). In the near future I will incorporate data for the 1993-95 legislative period.¹¹

The Argentine Chamber of Deputies possesses an electronic system of voting by which a deputy, from his/her seat, can utilize a key and then press a button with the vote then registered on an electronic scoreboard on the Chamber wall.¹² The other common method of voting involves a simple show of hands (normally used for non-conflictual votes).

A nominal vote can be taken in two ways. The most common is for the votes to be recorded from the electronic scoreboard. The other, more traditional, method is to

¹⁰ The PDP and FR, while competing in several provinces, are for all intents and purposes provincial parties in Santa Fe and Tucuman respectively. The PDP does however have some moderate support in the Capital Federal, and in 1989 won a chamber seat there (Gibson 1996).

¹¹ Only a small number of roll call votes were taken during the Alfonsín presidency (1983-89). For example, during the period December 10, 1984 to July 8, 1989, there were only 39 roll call votes in the Chamber (i.e., approximately eight a year; this excludes a small number of roll call votes employed in some years for the election of Chamber authorities). This comparative lack of roll call votes is suggestive of the greater level of UCR party discipline, which made the need for the use of roll calls to enforce party discipline less necessary. It is also the consequence of the deputies' relative lack of experience, the more consensual leadership style of the President of the Chamber between December 1983 and July 1989 (Juan Carlos Pugliese), and the UCR's minority position in the Senate (which necessitated a considerable level of prior inter-party negotiation than has been the case under Menem) (Mustapic and Goretti 1992).

¹² The information on the Chamber rules employed here comes primarily from Schinelli (1996).

pass a paper list around the chamber in alphabetic order. Nominal votes are rare and are generally only taken on conflictual issues where party leaders want to use them to enforce discipline and on controversial issues where deputies or parties want their vote (or the vote of others) to be public knowledge. A final use of the nominal methods is for votes related to the Chamber rules or specific constitutional duties of the Congress (i.e., impeachment proceedings, constitutional reform).

A nominal vote is taken when a motion for a nominal vote has been made and then supported by at least one-fifth of the deputies in attendance. Nominal votes are recorded in the *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación*. There are no exact data on what proportion of all votes taken during a given year are nominal, but it is doubtful that nominal votes account for more than 5% of the votes.¹³

During the 1989-91 period there were 103 roll call (i.e., nominal) votes taken. Of these 103 votes, 78 were considered to be at least moderately controverted (at least 20% of the Chamber deputies present voted for the losing option of yes or no) (Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán 1997). These 78 votes form the basis of this study's roll call vote analysis.

Several different types of votes are conducted in the Argentine chamber (e.g., votes on bills, votes on articles within bills, votes on motions, votes on recommending the impeachment of judges to the Senate, votes on altering the Chamber rules). Most of these votes require a "majority" of only a plurality vote of those voting, while others require a majority of two-thirds or three-quarters of those voting. A few other votes are based on a percentage of the 254/257 members (normally two-thirds), although

¹³ Fennell (1974) found that very few contested roll call votes (with contested defined as roll calls where at least 5% or more of those voting opposed the majority) took place during the 1900-1966 period. The mean number of contested roll calls during each two year period was 42, while the median was 27. Smith's (1974) meticulous analysis revealed that during the 1904-55 period 1712 roll call votes took place. Of these 1712, 1052 were defined by Smith as contested (i.e., at least 10% of those deputies voting took the minority position).

none of those votes were taken during this period. Of the 78 votes examined here for the 1989-91 period, 54 were decided on the basis of a plurality vote, 17 on the basis of a two-thirds vote, and 7 on the basis of a three-quarters vote. It should be noted that in addition to these voting rules, the Chamber cannot take a vote without a quorum, which is equal to 50% + 1 of the total number of legislators. For the period 1983-1991 the number necessary to achieve quorum was 128, while between 1991 and 1996 the number was 130. Since late 1996 the number has been 129.¹⁴

For every session of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies an attendance list is compiled. There are six principal categories: Present, On Leave, On Leave (vote on leave pending Chamber approval), Absent With Notice, and On A Official Mission. For those voting, there are three categories: Affirmative, Negative, Abstain.¹⁵ Deputies who at some point were present at the session, but were not on the Chamber floor at the time of the vote (or chose not to vote) are considered in this study to be Present But Not Voting.

PARTY DISCIPLINE IN THE ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

¹⁴ Under the current rules, more legislators must be present than absent. When all legislators are in office, this signifies a minimum number necessary to achieve quorum of 129.

¹⁵ A deputy technically must obtain permission from the Chamber to abstain. Most do not bother and abstain from the vote without seeking permission (although for most votes fewer than 5% of those voting abstain). However, in the event that those abstaining could have changed the outcome of a vote, the result of the vote generally is annulled and a new vote taken. Often abstentions in the roll call list are due to errors in the electronic voting system, which are rectified later in the debate by the deputies employing their right to correct an erroneous recording of their vote.

Table 3 provides information on the relative and absolute discipline of the principal political parties (i.e., those with more than three seats) during the 1989-91 period. Given the low proportion of roll call votes, these percentages should not be directly compared to those in other countries. At the most these data provide information on one extreme of party discipline in Argentina, expressing the levels of discipline on those votes that on average generate the most conflict within one or both of the major parties.

Table 3 about here

Relative discipline was calculated as the percentage of party members voting who voted with the majority of the party. Absolute discipline was calculated as the percentage of party members present at the session (at any time) who voted with the majority of the party.¹⁶ For the absolute discipline calculations in a few cases a plurality of the party chose to absent itself from the chamber floor. In these cases this choice was considered as the numerator to calculate the absolute level of party discipline.

The relative discipline levels are extremely high for all parties.¹⁷ Particularly for the PJ and UCR they indicate that it is extremely rare for a deputy to vote against his/her

¹⁶ For example in a vote where the majority of the party voted "yes" the relative discipline score would be calculated as: party members voting yes/(party members voting yes + party members voting no). For this same vote the absolute discipline score would be calculated as: party members voting yes/(party members voting yes + party members voting no + party members abstaining + party members present but not voting).

¹⁷ The respective un-weighted and weighted unity scores based on all 103 votes for the four respective parties are: Movimiento Peronista (0.78 and 0.77), Partido Justicialista (0.87 and 0.86), Unión del Centro Democrático (0.85 and 0.85), and Unión Cívica Radical (0.94 and 0.95). The un-weighted and weighted unity scores were calculated following the method recommended by Carey (this volume). The reader is reminded that roll call votes are held only

party in the Chamber. This is not surprising, since every Tuesday night (sessions occur normally on Wednesday and at times on other days such as Thursday) or on other nights as needed the PJ and UCR blocs meet (separately of course) and establish the way that the party will vote the next day(s). Or perhaps better said, the party leadership informs the deputies, with levels of debate varying from intense to subdued, what the party position (for the PJ, a position that during this time period normally has been strongly influenced by President Menem) will be.¹⁸ Those party members who oppose the position taken by the party generally will leave the floor at the time of the vote or less frequently will register their abstention.¹⁹ Only on rare occasions, and usually only when the legislator is voting as part of an organized larger group such as a provincial or regional (e.g., Patagonia) delegation, an intra-party faction (e.g., Duhaldistas [i.e., followers of Eduardo Duhalde, Buenos Aires governor between 1991 and 1999), or an ideological group (e.g., PJ deputies from the labor unions) will legislators actively register a "No" vote in the Chamber.²⁰ This is particularly the case for the UCR which is noticeably more disciplined and than the PJ.

Thus, the most common method of opposing the majority party position on a vote is to absent oneself from the floor at the time of the voting. This pattern of behavior is detected in the data in Table 3 with absolute discipline scores for all four parties that are significantly lower than the relative discipline scores. Ideally we would like to be

under special circumstances in Argentina, circumstances that are very distinct from those in Brazil and Chile. This difference in particular makes a direct comparison of the unity scores across Argentina, Brazil and Chile difficult.

¹⁸ Bills that are likely to result in serious voting divisions in the PJ have generally not been brought up on the floor during the 1989-97 period. An exception have been those bills which were urgent and indispensable for the economic reform program (at least prior to 1997).

¹⁹ For the PJ however, if too many deputies oppose the party line and remain intransigent, then most often the bill is not brought up during the session, often because in these instances the PJ decides not to provide deputies for the quorum, which during the 1989-97 period signified that no session was held due to the lack of a quorum.

²⁰ A recent (1997) example would be the "No" vote cast nominally by most of the PJ Patagonian deputies in opposition to President Menem's proposed deal with Chile to resolve the "Hielos Continentales" border dispute.

able to also include in this "Present But Not Voting" category many of those legislators who failed to attend the session, since a few undoubtedly are engaged in similar behavior. Unfortunately this cannot be done due to the inability to distinguish between deputies who are absent for valid reasons (e.g., illness, family crisis, transportation problems, district emergency) from those who are absent out of a desire to miss the vote.

Analysis of the 78 votes for the 1989-91 period reveals that the voting behavior of a party's legislators is very homogenous, with very little provincial-based voting differences. Overall, the provincial delegations do not appear to vote significantly different from the national party delegation. While there was a greater tendency for provincial oriented voting to occur on bills which directly affected the provinces, these results are modest. Furthermore, the results for the other votes are mostly devoid of provincial oriented voting. I also tested for the presence of a significant difference in voting between the metropolitan (i.e., Capital Federal, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, and Santa Fe) and peripheral provinces (Gibson 1997). There appears to be a weak significant difference for the PJ, with the PJ deputies from the metropolitan provinces tending to vote against the party majority in several instances. This behavior however virtually ceased with the defection of the 11 (mostly metropolitan) PJ deputies in late 1990/early 1991.

The lack of intra-party discipline differences among legislators based on their province is explained largely by a lack of importance of provincial origin when discussing bills that do not directly affect the interests of the provinces (see Eaton in this volume). In these instances the principal provincial level caudillos (e.g., governors, provincial party presidents) generally do not get involved in the voting.²¹

²¹ An exception would be for those bills for which there is a great deal of intra-PJ conflict (e.g., some economic reform bills) in which President Menem encounters serious resistance from a substantial portion of the PJ bloc. In these instances Menem often chooses to negotiate with PJ governors (or party

In contrast, where the bill under consideration would directly affect provincial interests, provincial level caudillos get directly involved, and the voting (when a prior consensus can not be reached) often reflects intra-party splits along provincial lines.

Overall these very preliminary findings suggest that in general provincial delegations do not vote significantly different from the rest the party, but when the issue has to do with provincial issues the interests of the provinces at times will supersede those of the party. This finding corresponds with that of Eaton (1997; and this volume) in his analysis of fiscal policy in Argentina.

EXPLAINING THE HIGH LEVELS OF PARTY DISCIPLINE.

The principal sources of this high level of party discipline stem primarily from the relationship between the party and political careers of legislators. First, the provincial level, and to a lesser extent the national level, party has a great deal of control over a legislator's access to the ballot, and hence their opportunity for re-election. Second, most legislators pursue political career pathways that are strongly linked to the party. Third, legislators who consistently vote against their party are likely to be expelled. Once expelled, legislators generally (with the partial exception of the recent experience of some Frepaso deputies) have a difficult time achieving either re-election or pursuing a career in politics due to the lack of an alternative viable political party to join.

leaders in those provinces lacking a PJ governor) who in turn (after an agreement with Menem, often involving economic resources, is reached) provide instructions, to those legislators who respond to them, to vote for the bill.

Fourth, linked to the above career related factors, party discipline in the legislature also is the product of the congressional party leadership's ability to determine the amount of resources/opportunity a legislator has to engage in political entrepreneurship at both the provincial and national level. Regardless of the legislator's career ambition (discrete, static, or progressive), these resources are vital to the fulfillment of his/her career goals.

Finally, being a Peronist or Radical is a fundamental part of many deputies' personal identity and social relations. To be expelled from the party (likely in the face of frequent indiscipline) thus carries consequences for the deputy beyond mere political career concerns.

RE-ELECTION AND PJ AND UCR INTERNAL PARTY POLITICS²²

Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) list three key features of electoral laws that influence the level of party discipline in a country: (1) pooling of votes among a party's candidates, (2) control over who runs on the party label, (3) control over the order in which members are elected from the party list.

In Argentina deputies are elected via closed party lists and thus for this office votes are pooled. This encourages deputies to engage in behavior that enhances the electoral prospects of their party (Molinelli 1991).

²² This section draws heavily from Jones (1997a).

Three important party groups exercise influence over the formation of the party lists (i.e., control who runs on the party list and what order they occupy) for the election of Chamber deputies: the national party organization, the district level party organization, and the district level rank-and-file party members (i.e., party affiliates). Both the PJ and UCR are divided into 24 district level party organizations (corresponding to the 23 provinces and federal capital) with central control exercised by a national party organization located in Capital Federal. The PJ and UCR district level organizations employ internal primaries (until very recently restricted to party affiliates only in nearly all districts) to select candidates for public office.²³ The primaries range from highly competitive races to instances where strong local party leaders impose a list/candidate of unity or local party elites agree on a single set of candidates with the result being either an uncontested primary or the avoidance of an internal election altogether.

National party organization: When a party's leader (*de facto* if not also *de jure*) is the president he/she has the ability to influence local party leaders through threats of fiscal or administrative reprisal/promises of fiscal or administrative reward, or in extreme cases the threat or real occurrence of the direct intervention of a province governed by a copartisan (i.e., where the national government assumes direct control of the provincial government). Thus when the leader of a party is also the president, the national party organization has a greater degree of influence over who runs on the district level party lists and the order they occupy than has the national organization of the party out of power.

²³ There is growing support within the PJ and UCR for the use of semi-open (party affiliates and independents) primaries. For example, in all of the most populous provinces where it held internal elections (i.e., Capital Federal, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Mendoza) in 1997, the PJ utilized semi-open primaries.

The national party, even when its leader is not the president, has two important powers which can be employed to influence the district level party organizations. First, the national party can intervene district level party organizations and take over their governance (expelling or suspending opponents).²⁴ Both the PJ and the UCR national party organizations have employed this mechanism, or the threat of it, to influence party related events at the district level. This strategy is however risky as it can potentially adversely affect the party's electoral performance in the intervened district.²⁵

District level party organization: The ability of the national party to influence district level party officials also depends on the relative strength and unity of the district level party organization. Best able to resist national party influence and defy national party authority are those district level organizations where the party leadership enjoys a high level of popularity with the party rank-and-file and strong control over the district level party organization. Least able to resist national party influence and defy national party authority are those district level organizations where different party tendencies (one of which is often linked to the national party organization) are in conflict with no single faction possessing secure control of the district party organization. Also, other factors held constant, the more important a district is electorally to the party, the better able its local party organization is to resist national party pressures.

In districts where prominent party leaders are highly unified (often under the hegemony of one individual) the district level organization has a great deal of control over who runs on its list and what order they occupy (e.g., the PJ in Buenos Aires in

²⁴ It also has the power to expel or suspend individual party members.

²⁵ For example in 1991 the PJ intervened its district level party organization in the province of Catamarca to replace the province's PJ leadership. In the congressional (and provincial) elections of 1991 the displaced PJ members formed their own independent list which competed against both the UCR as well as an official PJ list. The displaced group won 37% of the vote and one congressional seat while the official PJ list won only 14% of the vote and no seat. Furthermore, a UCR led alliance was able to take advantage of the PJ's internal difficulties and win the race for provincial governor.

1995 where Governor Eduardo Duhalde imposed a single congressional list). In districts where the local party leaders are not highly unified, the local party organization's ability to influence who is on its list and what order various candidates occupy is reduced (e.g., the PJ in Capital Federal in 1995).

Rank-and-file party members: The rank-and-file party members have an opportunity to influence who is on the party list and what order they occupy in two instances. First, when the national level party organization and district level party organization disagree over the composition of the party list and cannot come to an agreement among themselves, the rank-and-file (when the national party does not impose a list) is called upon to make the decision (e.g., the 1997 PJ Capital Federal primaries where a list backed by President Menem competed with, and defeated, a list backed by the dominant local factions of the PJ). The other (often related) instance where the rank-and-file plays an important role in the list formation process is when the district level party organization is divided and cannot agree on a common list (e.g., the PJ primary in Jujuy in 1998 where two lists competed, each backed by a different set of pro-Menem politicians).

In sum, three distinct party groups influence who runs on a party's list and what order they occupy. The national party's influence on candidate selection is greatest when (1) the president (*de facto* if not also *de jure*) of the party is also the president of the nation and (2) the district level party elites are not unified. The district level party organization's influence is greatest when (1) the party's president is not the president of the nation and (2) the district level party elites are unified. The rank-and-file party members' influence is greatest when there is disagreement over the list composition (1) between the national and district level party organizations and/or (2) within the district level organization.

As would be expected (although not assured) in a country where the provinces possess a considerable degree of autonomy, the provincial branches of the Argentine political parties tend to play a preeminent role in the electoral process at the district level (Jones 1997b). The provincial branches normally enjoy a significant amount of autonomy in regard to activities such as the creation of party lists and the formation of electoral alliances at the district level. This is not to say that the national party is not an important actor in the electoral process at the district level. On balance however, the provincial branches are dominant.²⁶

REELECTION AND LEGISLATOR CAREERS

A focus on the rules governing the election of deputies only partially explains the behavior of legislators. The reelection rate of Argentine Chamber deputies is comparatively very low. Since the return to democracy in 1983 the average reelection rate for deputies has been 20%, ranging from a high of 29% in 1985 to a low of 15% in 1995. Currently there are only three deputies (out of 257) who have served in the Chamber of Deputies continuously since 1983, one from the PJ and two from small provincial parties that they lead (the UCeDé in Capital Federal and the MPJ) (Saiegh 1997). The PJ and UCR are relatively similar in terms of their reelection rates for the 1985-97 period, although in the most recent four elections UCR deputies have been re-elected at a noticeably lower rate than their PJ counterparts. This lower

²⁶ I do not discuss Frepaso here due to this study's focus on the 1989-1997 period (Frepaso has only been a major legislative actor since December 1997) as well as the inchoate nature of the Frepaso alliance which makes any effort to analyze its internal functioning very difficult. Frepaso has elements that render it very undisciplined (its status as an alliance of different parties and its lack of a significant party apparatus), and at the same time other elements that allow it at times to be extremely disciplined (Frepaso's electoral success depends in large part on the considerable popularity of its two leaders, Graciela Fernández Meijide and Carlos "Chacho" Alvarez, thereby endowing them with considerable power vis-à-vis the behavior of their copartisans).

re-election rate is due in part to the general UCR party rule (which is presently being eliminated from the district-level party's statute in many provinces) that requires incumbents to win two-thirds of the vote in the intra-party primary election to gain the right to run for re-election. While this requirement can be quite easily met via a negotiated agreement with opposing intra-party forces, it nonetheless represents an additional hurdle faced by UCR deputies that is not encountered by their PJ counterparts.

There are three principal reasons for this relatively low reelection rate. First, to be reelected legislators must compete in internal party primaries. The data in Table 4 indicate that during the 1991-97 period an average of 26% of all deputies surpassed this first hurdle. This number however only includes those deputies who both desired re-election and obtained a position on the party list. The number that actually desire re-election is considerably higher, but unfortunately very difficult to accurately measure. It also should be noted that, most often, sitting deputies do not occupy places on the party list from which they stand no realistic chance of election. Thus this average of 26%, with a few exceptions, reflects the percentage of deputies who are able to achieve a list position from which they had a good possibility of election.

Second, due to the vagaries of electoral politics, every election several deputies who occupy relatively high positions on the party lists are not elected as a consequence of the sagging electoral fortunes of their party. For example, between 1991 and 1997, one-third of those incumbents who obtained a position on the party list, nevertheless did not achieve re-election, in many cases due to the reduced level of support received by their party at the polls.

Insert Table 4 about here

Third, the political careers of most politicians do not involve extended stays in the Chamber of Deputies. Instead, of possessing static ambitions, a large majority of deputies have either discrete or, more commonly, progressive ambitions. In the cases of either static or progressive ambition (and even in a few instances discrete ambition) party loyalty influences deputies' prospects for a political future either as a national legislator, national or provincial government official, or party leader at the provincial, county or municipal level.

POLITICAL CAREERS IN ARGENTINA

Prior empirical research on the career pathways of Argentine politicians during the post-1955 era does not exist.²⁷ Initial analysis however indicates that the career pathways of Argentine Chamber deputies, during the post-1983 period, are extremely party oriented.²⁸ Virtually all deputies arrive to the Chamber having previously occupied an elective, appointive (in a national or provincial executive branch), or party post. Following their tenure in the Chamber, an equally high percentage continue in elective, appointive, or partisan posts. The consequence is a very strong link between the careers of legislators and their relationship with their party. Without continued good party ties, deputies will not have success in their political careers. Maintenance of these good ties requires, among other things, normally following the party instructions for voting in the Chamber.²⁹

²⁷ Excellent studies of the career pathways of Argentine members of Congress between 1889 and 1955 are provided by Cantón (1966) and Smith (1974).

²⁸ This analysis is based on extensive interviewing with political elites and archival research as well as the consultation of two excellent recent sources (Sinatra and Veléz 1994; Veléz 1997).

²⁹ In a future version of this chapter I will analyze the link between the voting records of deputies during the 1993-95 period and their subsequent political positions following the end of their term in 1995. In future work I also plan to carry out a similar career analysis, albeit somewhat distinct (due to data limitations) of deputies from the 1987-91 and 1993-97 legislative classes.

Table 5 provides information on the last elective, appointive, party or other post held by PJ and UCR deputies prior to the start of the 1991-95 congressional term.³⁰ Table 6 provides information on the same posts held by these deputies two and a half years after the end of their term in office (i.e., as of mid-1998).

Insert Table 5 about here

Insert Table 6 about here

Nineteen posts are included in the tables, covering the gamut of the positions occupied by these individuals before and after the 1991-95 term. The national level posts included are: Vice President, National Executive Branch (i.e., the individual held an appointive post in the National Executive Branch), National Deputy, and National Senator. The provincial level posts include: Governor, Vice Governor, Provincial Party President (that is a person who held no post other than the presidency of the party at the provincial level), Provincial Executive Branch, and Provincial Legislator. The municipal level posts are: Mayor and Municipal Councilor. The remaining categories are: Business Association President, Career Diplomat, Union Leader, Party Activity (no formal high level position was held, but the person was actively engaged in party activities and held a lower level party post), and Private Activity (the person was not engaged in any noteworthy partisan activity nor did they hold any elective or appointive position). Finally, three categories are exclusive to the post-95 careers: Deceased, Prison/Fugitive, Defector (i.e., the person defected to another party).

Table 5 provides information on the last position held by the deputies of the 1991-95 legislative class prior to their assumption as national deputies. Of the 108 deputies, all but six (6%) either held a political or party post (e.g., as a national, provincial, or

³⁰ Only PJ and UCR deputies who served more than a year during the 1991-95 period are included in the analysis population.

municipal level official) prior to their election as deputy.³¹ The most prominent penultimate post among these deputies was provincial legislator (29%).³² One-half of the UCR deputies were provincial legislators prior to their assuming office in 1991. Other common posts held by these individuals immediately prior to 1991 include national deputy (17%), mayor (10%), functionary in the national executive branch (9%), and functionary in the provincial executive branch (8%).

Table 6 indicates that after the deputies of the 1991-95 class completed their term in office, an overwhelming majority continued a career path that was tightly linked to their respective party. Of the 108 legislators, as of mid-1998, 81 were in positions that were strongly influenced by their party ties/position within the party. Of these 81, 51% held elective office at the national, provincial or municipal level, 28% were active solely as party leaders at the provincial, county or municipal level, while 21% occupied appointive posts in the national or provincial executive branches.³³

The remaining 27 legislators can be divided into three groups. First, are those six in posts (5 Union Leaders and 1 Business Association President) with a high political content, where ties to the PJ were an integral part of their position (particularly for the union leaders). Second, are those seven who because of prior events could not continue in any of the elective, appointive, or party posts. They are the two deceased individuals, the prisoner (prior to his incarceration he occupied an important post in the National Executive Branch), the fugitive, and the three deputies who defected to another party (all three continue to be active in politics, one as a national deputy).

³¹ The position of union leader, particularly for Peronists, is for all intents and purposes a political position.

³² Furthermore, between 1983 and 1991, of the 108 deputies, 40 (37%) at one time held the post of provincial legislator.

³³ With a few exceptions a party leadership position at the county or municipal level does not carry with it any type of salary. These posts however provide the individual with a considerable amount of political power, and it is furthermore quite common for many of these local level leaders to receive some type of salary through an appointive post in the national, provincial, or municipal executive branches or in the national, provincial, or municipal legislatures.

Third, in sum only 14 of the 108 (13%) deputies actually voluntarily departed from the political scene. Moreover, even after having left politics, many of these 14 individuals continue in careers in which their success is aided by their political connections and good relations with fellow party members.³⁴

Further evidence of the progressive ambition held by many Chamber deputies is provided by an analysis of the previous careers of the current national senators (1995-98) and of the participation of sitting deputies in the 1995 gubernatorial and presidential elections. The post of deputy is clearly viewed as a springboard to higher office by a substantial portion of politicians.

Of the 70 national senators as of March 1996, 37% had previous experience as national deputies.³⁵ Nearly a third (31%) of the PJ senators had previous experience as deputies, while one-half of the UCR senators previously occupied a seat in the lower house. Chamber deputy is the plurality penultimate position held by current senators.

In 1995, 29 sitting deputies (and six senators) ran for the office of governor. Further, of the three relevant presidential tickets in 1995, two had vice-presidential candidates (Carlos "Chacho" Alvarez of Frepaso and Antonio María Hernández of the UCR) who were sitting deputies. The other vice-presidential candidate (Carlos Ruckauf of the

³⁴ Two examples are a former PJ deputy from Misiones who owns an industrial dry-cleaning service that receives a substantial portion of its revenue from contracts with the provincial and municipal governments and a former UCR deputy from La Pampa who is a lobbyist for one of Argentina's main telephone companies. Of the remaining 12 former deputies, at least two (each of whom has a long history of activity in partisan and elective positions) were not politically active strictly due to their poor health.

³⁵ The senators in the 1995-98 group analyzed assumed office between December 1989 and December 1996. Only 70 senators are included. Due to a political impasse between the Catamarca provincial legislature, the PJ candidate for senator in Catamarca (Ramón Saadi) and the Senate, Catamarca has had only one of its three senators in office since December 10, 1995.

PJ), as well as two of the presidential candidates (José Octavio Bordón of Frepaso and Horacio Massaccesi of the UCR) were former deputies.³⁶

Three important points can be drawn from this analysis of legislator political careers. First, only a small fraction of deputies are able to pursue a career as a national deputy.

Second, most deputies are involved in a career path within the political party that necessitates the maintenance of their good standing within the party. The nature of these career pathways varies considerably. Some individuals begin as mayors, move on to a post as national deputy, and finally reach the Senate. Others are second tier party activists who spend one term in Buenos Aires (normally placed on the list by a powerful sponsor within the party) and then go back to their province either to continue their work within the party or to hold a position in the provincial legislature. Still others start as a provincial legislator, eventually arriving as a national deputy, and then either return home (from which they may return to Buenos Aires as a national deputy in the future) or move on to the Senate.

In all cases however, the common denominator for these deputies is that to pursue their desired career pathway, they must maintain a good relationship with the party. One of the pre-requisites to maintain this good relationship is the adherence to party rules and codes of conduct, one of which is voting the party line in the legislature. While the province or an internal party faction to which the deputy belongs may at times mandate/recommend a vote against the party line, when these suggestions are not provided, the deputy must (barring a good explanation in the Tuesday evening bloc meeting) vote the party line. While the party leadership is willing to tolerate a modest amount of indiscipline, too much indiscipline (particularly if it is not part of a

³⁶ In addition, the two most successful minor party candidates (Aldo Rico of MODIN and Fernando "Pino" Solanas of the Alianza Sur) were both sitting deputies.

larger political battle, such as that between different factions or provincial delegations within the party) is very likely to create serious problems for the deputy's political future.

The data demonstrate convincingly that the political careers of these politicians remain firmly linked to the party. Whether they remain in the legislature, move on to the national or provincial executive branches, or return to their province to continue their militancy in the party, these politicians' careers are directly influenced by their relationship with their party. Thus by maintaining a relatively disciplined voting record in the Congress, these legislators also maintain their good standing within the party at both the national and provincial level.

EXPULSION/DEFECTION

A deputy who consistently votes against his/her party will eventually be expelled. Knowing this, most deputies who are consistently at odds with the party often will defect (i.e., jump before they are pushed). There are three principal types of defection: defect and form your own unipersonal bloc, defect with others and create your own new party, and defect to another party. With the possible exception of a few recent defections from the PJ to Frepaso and from Frepaso to the PJ (the latter defections via the now-defunct PAIS [Política Abierta para la Integridad Social]), the latter behavior has been extremely rare in the post-1983 period, due in large part to the existence (until the 1994 emergence of Frepaso) of only two relevant political parties (the PJ and UCR). Defections from the PJ to the UCR, and vice-versa, are extremely rare; for ideological, historic and personal reasons. Thus legislators who defect/are expelled, have generally found themselves in the political wilderness, with moribund political careers. A few have tried to create their own micro-party, but in virtually all instances have not had any electoral success. In addition to the basic problem of obtaining

electoral support (combined with the lack of institutional and financial resources with which to campaign), these legislators also need to surpass institutional obstacles such as obtaining official recognition of their party. Obtaining party status at the district level requires, among other bureaucratic hurdles, providing the National Election Board with the official adhesions [i.e., voters who are registered as members of the proto-party] of a number of registered voters equal to, at the minimum, 0.004% of the province's registered voters (Gómez de la Fuente and Pérez Colman 1995).³⁷ In the end, most of these defectors have either left politics, or eventually returned to their former party, albeit at a level far below that which they occupied prior to their departure.

Indeed, this was the situation in which many of the members of the "Grupo de los Ocho" (Movimiento Peronista) found themselves following their defection from the PJ. Their political careers were saved by the fortuitous circumstances of the 1993 PJ-UCR "Pacto de Olivos," which paved the way for the constitutional reform that facilitated President Carlos Menem's re-election. At the same time, the Pacto de Olivos deeply discredited the UCR's status as a reliable opposition to the PJ (Jones 1997a; McGuire 1997; Olivera 1995). This strategic error by the UCR allowed many of these former PJ deputies to restart their political careers via the electoral success of the Frente Grande in the 1994 Constituent Assembly elections.³⁸

³⁷ For information on the extremely prominent role played by the Argentine political parties in the financing of electoral campaigns, see Olivero (1994).

³⁸ The UCR's strategic error should be seen as a necessary, but not sufficient, explanation for the success of the Frente Grande (Cheresky 1994; Novaro 1998). The Frente Grande's novel discourse/message and positive public image were in large part successful for its long term success (i.e., one can contrast the trajectory of the Frente Grande with that of MODIN, a right-wing party led by Aldo Rico). Like the Frente Grande, MODIN was a small party with limited popular support that was very successful in the 1994 Constituent Assembly elections. Unlike the Frente Grande (now the major force within Frepaso), which is poised to co-govern with the UCR during the next (1999-2003) presidential term, MODIN failed to win any Chamber seats in the 1995 and 1997 congressional elections and dissolved itself in early 1998.

INTERNAL LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION

The previous sections examined the sources of discipline that stem from the importance of a legislator's relationship with his/her party for re-election or a post-legislative career. This section examines the important role of the party leadership in the Chamber in influencing the behavior of legislators.

The principal organizing unit in the Argentine Chamber is the party bloc. All parties with three or more members constitute a bloc with a president and any other authorities they wish to designate (the PJ and UCR party directorates have several other officers and members).³⁹ Once designated the party leader generally enjoys a considerable amount of autonomy, although this does not imply that he/she does not need to negotiate with the other deputies/factions in his/her party.

The discussion below focuses on the topic of party leadership in the PJ and UCR. Minor parties are excluded, as during the 1989-97 period they held very few seats in the Chamber, and thus had internal dynamics that are very distinct from those within the PJ and UCR.⁴⁰

When discussing the blocs, it is important to place this discussion within the political context of the 1989-97 period. First, during this time period the PJ was the dominant force in the Chamber, enjoying either an absolute majority or near-majority of the legislative seats. As such it operated in a rather hegemonic manner, both in the allocation of committee positions as well as in the construction of the legislative agenda in the Legislative Activity Commission (Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria

³⁹ Parties that enjoy the status of bloc do not lose it in the event that their membership drops to one or two members (De Riz and Feldman 1990).

⁴⁰ An exception is the Frepaso bloc since December 1997. Even after this date however, the functioning of the Frepaso bloc continues to be distinct primarily for the reasons discussed in note 26.

[CLP]).⁴¹ Furthermore, whereas the leadership of the UCR was firmly held by one person, the Chamber party leader; the PJ leader at times partially has had to share his leadership of the PJ bloc with the President of the Chamber.⁴² Since July of 1989 the Chamber president has been Alberto Pierri (PJ, Buenos Aires).⁴³

The party leader possesses several important resources at his disposal with which to influence legislator behavior. These resources are committee/bloc assignments, budgetary resources, and control over the flow of legislation.

A deputy wishing to further his/her political career, and/or be an effective legislator, requires resources. Independent of whether the deputy wishes to be re-elected, move on to higher office, return to their previous status as an important local leader, or have a successful tenure as a legislator prior to returning to private activity, resources are required. All deputies are aided in their efforts to the extent that they can maintain an active presence in the province (which requires money/resources), achieve media exposure, and be seen as actively working on behalf of the province and/or the nation. The party leader in turn has a great deal of influence on the ability of a legislator to achieve these goals.

All legislators in Argentina receive a base disbursement of approximately 5000 U.S dollars a month to pay the salaries of their staff.⁴⁴ Given the combined need to

⁴¹ While the CLP operates in part based on consensus, each party leader possesses a number of votes equal to the size of his/her bloc in the Chamber. When a disagreement occurs, the majority position will normally prevail.

⁴² Furthermore, throughout this period both the PJ party leaders (José Luis Manzano, Jorge Matzkin, Humberto Roggero) and Pierri have had to contend with the overarching power of President Menem.

⁴³ There is an informal rule that the President of the Chamber is always a legislator from the Province of Buenos Aires.

⁴⁴ The deputies actually have the right to hire a set number of people at differing fixed pay scales (e.g., secretary, advisor category three). Virtually all deputies informally or formally divide these salaries among a larger number of staffers. The reader should be aware that the cost of living in Argentina for the past five years has been roughly equivalent to that in Washington, D.C. For additional information on legislator staff and budgetary resources see Pellet Lastra (1992).

maintain a presence in their province, and the demands of their legislative tasks, this amount is generally insufficient. The party leader however can be of great assistance in terms of additional staff in three respects: a committee leadership appointment, an appointment on the party directorate, the use of his/her own budgetary resources to finance more staff.

Every two years following the assumption by the legislators elected during the partial renovation, committee positions are allocated among the parties by the President of the Chamber in rough proportion to the percentage of seats held by the parties in the Chamber. At the same time, based on the distribution of forces in the Chamber, the President also decides (in consultation with the presidents of the various party blocs) which committee leadership positions (President, Vice-President, Secretary) correspond to which parties. Once this allocation has been decided, the leadership of each of the parties determines how its committee assignments will be allocated.⁴⁵

While the party leader must engage in a great deal of negotiation and respect informal rules in this allocation, he/she maintains considerable latitude in determining who receives which committee assignments. These assignments are important in four respects: additional staff allocations, media exposure, additional budget resources, and possibilities for favor trading.

With a few minor exceptions, every committee president receives extra resources for staff salary which amount to approximately 50% of the base allocation received by each legislator. In addition the committee president has at his/her disposal the permanent staff assigned to the committee. Committee vice-presidents and secretaries

⁴⁵ Technically the Chamber President makes all committee appointments. However, in all instances with opposition parties, and in virtually all instances with the PJ, Pierri has respected the nominations made by the respective party leaders.

also receive additional resources for staff salary which amount to approximately 25% of the base allocation received by each legislator.

Not all committees are created equal. Of the 40 Chamber committees (as of 1997), some are highly valued whereas others are not.⁴⁶ The benefits provided by different committees can vary. Some (such as Impeachment and Foreign Affairs) provide a great deal of media exposure, whereas others (Budget and Finance, Constitutional Affairs, Energy and Fuel, General Legislation, Justice) provide opportunities to influence important legislation, while finally others (Budget and Finance, Education, Housing, Joint Library of Congress) provide additional opportunities to acquire resources for a deputy's own political activities and for favor-trading with other deputies. Conversely, many committees provide little opportunity for the receipt of any of the above benefits (e.g., Culture, Drug Addiction, Population and Human Resources, Senior Citizens).

The chief arbitrator in the bi-annual battle for committee posts within the party is the party leader. This provides the leader with considerable leverage over the behavior of individual legislators.

The party leader also can influence the amount of resources legislators receive through a variety of other mechanisms. One, by appointing a legislator to the party directorate in the Chamber, the party leader insures that the legislator will receive an increase in staff salary of approximately 25% over base. Two, the party leader has at his disposal a moderate amount of additional staff resources that he can allocate at his discretion. Three, every bloc leader receives from the Chamber a modest disbursement of money each month in proportion to the number of deputies in the bloc (approximately \$1000

⁴⁶ In addition to these 40 committees there are also quite a few joint (i.e., with the Senate) and special investigative committees.

per deputy). These funds provide an additional resource which the party leader can distribute among deputies for office, staff, and political related expenses.⁴⁷

Prior to all legislative sessions, the legislative agenda is programmed by the Legislative Activity Committee (CLP). The members of this committee are the Chamber President and three Vice-Presidents and the presidents of all of the recognized blocs in the Chamber (or their designated alternates).⁴⁸ This committee decides what bills will be treated during the session, who will speak during the floor debate, the hours of the session, etc. Important for our discussion here is the role of the party leader as the principal advocate for the legislation sponsored by his/her party's members and his/her role in influencing who are the principal participants during the oral debate on the floor. Thus the president of the party is a very important gatekeeper vis-à-vis the ability of legislation to reach the floor. If a party leader so desires he/she can generally keep any bill off the floor (particularly the PJ leader during the 1989-97 period). The same is true for a deputy's participation in debates, which is determined in large part by the party leader. In addition, the party leader's goal as gatekeeper also extends, albeit more indirectly, to the committee level, where his/her party's principal leader on the committee is able to influence the treatment of legislation within the committee, and who owes, in part, his/her position to the party leader (Goretti and Panosyan 1986).

⁴⁷ All legislators receive a base amount of resources for the granting of subsidies to non-profit and governmental institutions (approximately \$18,000-\$20,000 in 1998), of pensions to individuals (approximately \$1200 per month all together [a sum which is almost always divided among several individuals], including medical coverage), and of a small number of modest scholarships to university students. They also receive a limited number of plane tickets and bus passes (the former of which normally they or their staff either use or trade in for their cash equivalent) and the latter of which are often distributed to individuals in their provinces who need to travel to Buenos Aires or to colleagues in the party who need to travel on party related business.

⁴⁸ Normally the only people from the major parties who attend these meetings are the first and or second vice-presidents of the bloc. The respective party leaders (i.e., the party presidents) generally attend only when the former group has been unable to resolve a complicated or controversial issue.

While all deputies have the right to propose that a bill be discussed on the floor, without the support of the party leadership, these proposals almost always are quickly defeated. Similarly while deputies can at times participate in the debate even when they have not been scheduled as speakers (assuming someone yields time to them), this participation without party support is relatively uncommon, and normally quite limited in those instances where it takes place.

THE PERSONAL/HISTORICAL FACTOR

In addition to the career related incentives for legislators, to fully understand the high levels of party discipline one must also comprehend the strong personal and historical ties which many deputies have to their party. A large majority of PJ and UCR deputies have been active in partisan politics since their mid to late teens. Many of the current PJ and UCR deputies, especially the Peronists, suffered extreme levels of persecution during the 1976-83 military dictatorship due to their partisan activity. A smaller, yet significant group of current deputies (primarily Peronists) suffered similar difficulties during the 1955-73 period. Being a Peronist or Radical is therefore a very important part of many deputies' personal identity. Similarly, a large part of their social network is within the party.

Therefore, for many deputies consistently voting against their party, and in turn facing the possibility of expulsion, is not a decision to be taken lightly. For them the decision to remain a Peronist or Radical is much more than a simple rational calculation of costs and benefits vis-a-vis their political career. This personal factor is thus an important final, albeit non-institutional, determinant of the high levels of party discipline in the Argentine Chamber.

Finally, at least within Peronism, there is a strong tradition of loyalty to the leader (i.e., Perón) and to the party hierarchy in general. Many Peronists (although fewer than in the past) still view Peronists who leave the party as traitors, and are often not reluctant to publicly brand those who have left as such (particularly when a debate gets heated). Thus, this tradition of loyalty within Peronism acts a further constraint on at least some politicians who might consider breaking with the party. The effect is both internal (i.e., they would consider themselves to be engaging in treasonous activity) and external (they would in all likelihood receive sanctions in the form of hostility by many of their former comrades).

CONCLUSION

Party discipline in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies is relatively high. This strong level of discipline stems primarily from a combination of the institutional rules governing elections and intra-legislative organization in Argentina. These rules, combined with a majority of legislators possessing progressive ambition, helps in large part to explain the rarity of legislators voting against their party's position on the legislative floor.

This analysis has only examined one legislative term, 1989-91. I will incorporate analysis of roll call data from the 1993-95 period in a future version of this chapter. This forthcoming analysis will in addition examine the link between each deputy's (who belongs to the class of 1991-95) level of absolute and relative discipline in the legislature and their post-1995 political careers.

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TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF SEATS HELD IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES BY PARTY: 1983-1999

Political Party	1983-85	1985-87	1987-89	1989-91	1991-93	1993-95	1995-97	1997-99
Partido Justicialista	43,7	40,6	42,9	50,0	50,2	50,2	52,1	46,7
Unión Cívica Radical	50,8	51,2	46,1	37,0	33,1	32,7	26,9	26,5
UCeDé	0,8	1,2	2,8	4,7	4,3	2,0	0,8	0,4
Center-Right Provincial Parties	3,2	4,3	5,9	7,1	9,3	9,3	8,2	10,5
Center-Left and Left Parties	1,6	2,8	2,4	1,2	2,0			
MODIN					1,2	2,7	1,6	
Frepaso						3,1	9,7	16,0
Total	100,1 254 seats	100,1 254 seats	100,1 254 seats	100 254 seats	100,1 257 seats	100 257 seats	100 257 seats	100,1 257 seats

PERCENTAGE OF SEATS HELD IN THE SENATE BY PARTY: 1983-1998

Political Party	1983-86	1986-89	1989-92*	1992-95	1995-98
Partido Justicialista	45,6	45,6	54.4/54.2	62,5	55,6
Unión Cívica Radical	39,1	39,1	30.4/29.2	22,9	29,2
Center-Right Provincial Parties	15,2	15,2	15.2/16.7	14,6	13,9
Frepaso					1,4
TOTAL	99,99 46 Seats	99,99 46 Seats	100/100.1 46/48 seats	100 48 seats	100,1 72 seats

* In 1990 the then national territory of Tierra del Fuego achieved provincial status. The province elected two senators in 1992.

All seat totals are based on election results and do not account for minor seat changes due to defections during the congressional term of a deputy or senator. These defections are however relatively infrequent and minor in scope. For the PJ in a few instances parties which represent PJ splinters at the provincial level are included with the PJ total above. Finally, included with the PJ and UCR totals are those candidates elected on the PJ/UCR lists. In a few isolated cases members of the PI, PDC and other parties have been elected on the PJ ticket. This phenomenon is less common for the UCR, but occurs on occasion. Center-Right Provincial Parties effectively compete in only one province. They tend to occupy the center-right/right portion of the ideological spectrum. The totals for Frepaso include deputies elected from parties (Frente Grande, Unidad Socialista) which later joined together to form Frepaso.

Source: Jones 1997 and the Dirección Nacional Electoral de la República Argentina.

TABLE 2: ACTUAL PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF THE ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1989-91

PROVINCE	TOTAL	PJ (89-90)	UCR	UCEDE	PDC*	PI*	PROV PARTY*	OTHERS*	PJ (91)	MP (91)	AP (91)
Buenos Aires	70	32	23	6	2	2		5	27	5	
Capital Federal	25	8	9	5			2 (PDP+PF)	1	6	2	
Catamarca	5	3	2						3		
Chaco	7	4	3						4		
Chubut	5	3	2						3		
Cordoba	18	7	10		1				7		
Corrientes	7	2	2				3 (PL+PA)		2		
Entre Rios	9	5	4						3	1	1
Formosa	5	2	2				0/1 (MID)	1	0		1
Jujuy	6	4					2 (MPJ)		4		
La Pampa	5	3	2						3		
La Rioja	5	4	1						4		
Mendoza	10	5	4				1 (PD)		5		
Misiones	7	4	3						4		
Neuquen	5	1	2				2 (MPN)		1		
Rio Negro	5	2	2				1 (PPR)		2		
Salta	7	3	2				2 (PRS)		3		
San Juan	6	3	1				2 (CR+PB)		3		
San Luis	5	3	2						3		
Santa Cruz	5	3	2						3		
Santa Fe	19	10	6				2 (PDP)	1	10		
Stgo. del Estero	7	4	3						4		
T. del Fuego	2	1	1						0		1
Tucuman	9	4	2				3 (FR+BB)		4		
Total	254	120	90	11	3	2	21	7	108	8	3

NOTE: The party of the provincial governor is in bold. One of the "other" deputies from Buenos Aires was elected on the PJ list (as were the two PDC and two PI deputies) while two of the "other" deputies from Buenos Aires were elected on the UCR list. In 1991 a PJ deputy who resigned was replaced by a MID deputy in Formosa. The MID and PJ had presented on a single list. The "other" deputy from Formosa was elected on the PJ list. The PDC deputy from Cordoba was elected on the PJ list.

TABLE 3: PARTY DISCIPLINE IN THE ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1989-91

PARTY		RELATIVE PARTY DISCIPLINE	ABSOLUTE PARTY DISCIPLINE
Partido Justicialista	mean	94	72
	median	97	73
Unión Cívica Radical	mean	98	72
	median	100	73
Unión del Centro Democrático	mean	92	68
	median	100	67
Movimiento Peronista*	mean	89	72
	median	100	71

* Based on data from 1991 only.

NOTE: Only those parties that held more than three seats are included above.

TABLE 4: RE-ELECTION TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1991-1997

YEAR	PARTY	NUMBER OF SEATS BEING RENEWED	NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS PRESENTING	NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS RE-ELECTED	PRESENTING INCUMBENTS' SUCCESS RATE (%)
1991	Partido Justicialista	62	12	10	83
	Unión Cívica Radical	46	5	3	60
	UCeDé	5	4	2	50
	Provincial Parties	9	5	3	60
	Other Parties***	5	2	1	50
	Total	127	28 (22%)	19 (15%)	
1993	Partido Justicialista	66	12*	11*	92
	Unión Cívica Radical	41	8	3	38
	UCeDé	6	2	0	0
	Provincial Parties	11	5	3	60
	Other Parties	3	2	1	50
	PJ Defectors		4	1	25
Total	127	33 (26%)	19 (15%)		
1995	Partido Justicialista	63	10*	9*	90
	Unión Cívica Radical	43	6	3	50
	UCeDé	3	1	1	100
	Provincial Parties	14	4	2	50
	Other Parties	7	2	2	100
	PJ Defectors		3	2	67
Total	130	26 (20%)	19 (15%)		
1997	Partido Justicialista	66	21*	14*	67
	Unión Cívica Radical	41	14	12	86
	UCeDé	1	0	0	
	Provincial Parties	10	2**	2**	100
	Other Parties	9	3**	2**	67
	PJ Defectors		2	1	50
	Minor Party Defectors		2	0	0
	Total	127	44 (35%)	31 (24%)	

* PJ figures do not include defectors who ran for office on the list of another party. All of the successful PJ defectors were elected on a Frente Grande/Frepaso list.

** Does not include defectors (one from Frepaso and one from the MPJ) who ran for office on the list of another party.

*** Includes four deputies from minor parties who were elected in 1987 on either a UCR or PJ list.

The percentages of deputies who achieved re-election for the seven elections held since 1985 are: 1985 (29), 1987 (22), 1989 (21), 1991 (15), 1993 (15), 1995 (15), 1997 (24).

TABLE 5: LAST POST HELD BY DEPUTY PRIOR TO ASSUMING OFFICE

POSITION	TOTAL	PJ	UCR
Provincial Legislator	31	9	22
National Deputy	18	13	5
Mayor	11	7	4
National Executive Branch*	10	8	2
Provincial Executive Branch	9	9	0
Businessperson	5	4	1
Party Activist	5	4	1
President of Provincial Party	4	1	3
Governor	3	2	1
Municipal Councilor	3	1	2
Union Leader	3	2	1
Vice Governor	3	3	0
Career Diplomat	1	0	1
Federal Judge	1	1	0
National Senator	1	0	1
TOTAL	108	68	44

* Includes appointees to the Attorney General's office and political ambassadors.

TABLE 6: POST HELD BY DEPUTIES FROM THE CLASS OF 1991-95 AS OF MID-1998

POSITION	TOTAL	PJ	UCR
Party Activity	22	6	16
National Deputy	17	11	6
Private Activity	13	8	5
Provincial Legislator	10	6	4
National Senator	9	4	5
Provincial Executive Branch	9	6	3
National Executive Branch*	8	8	0
Union Leader	5	5	0
Defector	3	2	1
Deceased	2	2	0
Prison/Fugitive	2	2	0
Business Association President	1	1	0
Career Diplomat	1	1	0
Governor	1	0	1
Mayor	1	1	0
Municipal Councilor	1	0	1
Party President (only post)	1	1	0
Vice Governor	1	0	1
Vice President	1	1	0
TOTAL	108	68	44

* Includes appointees to the Attorney General's office and political ambassadors.